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Implications for Policy and Practice
In jurisdictions where mandatory-arbitration policies for employment disputes are 
enforceable, they can be a useful tool for employers and employees alike.
b y  DAVID S. SHERWYN a n d  J. BRUCE TRACEY
The hospitality industry’s increasingly diverse labor force and ongoing problems with employee turnover have created a breeding ground for claims of employment 
discrimination. The internal and external costs associated with 
such claims have convinced employers to examine the use of 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and, specifically, man­
datory arbitration, to adjudicate employment-discrimination 
lawsuits. In a 1995 C orn ell Q uarterly  article, Joseph I. 
Goldstein described the legal standing of ADR and discussed 
its positive aspects.1 While Goldstein’s article introduced the
1 J.I. Goldstein, “Alternatives to High-cost Litigation,” C orn ell H otel 
a n d  R estaurant A dm inistration Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (February 1995), 
pp. 28-33.
©  2001, CORNELL UNIVERSITY This article previously appeared in 
the October 1997 issue of Cornell Quarterly.
subject, it did not definitively state whether employers can, 
in fact, legally implement a mandatory ADR program (e.g., 
mandatory arbitration) or how employers might implement 
such a plan.
To address those issues, we first explain the problems with 
the current systems for settling claims of employment dis­
crimination and argue that hospitality employers should con­
sider mandatory arbitration as a means for resolving such dis­
putes.2 Second, we analyze the current law and identify
2 It should be noted that this discussion focuses on nonunion employers. 
As we explain in this article, arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining 
agreements generally cannot prevent employees from filing discrimination 
claims. Also as explained here, an exception occurs in the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, but that case seemingly contradicts precedent from the 
U.S. Supreme Court and other circuits.
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jurisdictions where it is lawful for an employer 
to require employees to arbitrate discrimination 
claims. Finally, we discuss the issues that need to 
be examined to create and implement a lawful 
and well-received arbitration policy.
Adjudication Is Expensive and 
Inefficient
The many shortcomings to the current system 
of ad jud icating  em ploym ent disputes are 
explained at length in the sidebar discussion 
on pages 64 and 65. In summary these short­
comings are as follows.
First, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (among 
other developments) makes employment- 
discrimination claims attractive to plaintiffs by 
allowing jury trials and providing for punitive 
and compensatory damages. As a result, many 
claims that are filed today can be characterized 
as frivolous or nuisance complaints. Prior to 1991 
damages typically consisted of reinstatement, 
back pay, and attorneys’ fees and were mainly 
settled out of court or through the intervention 
of a government agency (such as the Equal Em­
ployment Opportunity Commission, or EEOC).
Second, settlements are larger than before de­
spite the actual merits of the complaints. This is 
due in part to employers’ concerns regarding the 
costs associated w ith dragging the dispute 
through the legal system.
Third, the current system of adjudication is 
essentially a d e fa c to  severance system—a process 
of settling claims regardless of merit or validity. 
This is because it is simple for an employee to 
file a charge of discrimination and it is costly for 
an employer to defend against that charge. As a 
result, there is a strong incentive for employers 
to settle cases regardless of their merit.
Fourth, the system provides government in­
vestigators with a strong incentive to settle cases, 
also regardless of the cases’ merits. For example, 
some agencies evaluate the investigators by how 
many cases they close each quarter, and it is stan­
dard procedure for some state investigators to 
attempt to settle a case without even discussing 
the case’s merits or reviewing the file.
Fifth, claims are not being investigated in a 
timely or comprehensive manner. One reason for 
delay is that the increase in the number of cases 
filed has coincided with a decrease in the num­
ber of EEOC investigators.
Overall, the negative effects of the system on 
both hospitality firms and employees is evidenced 
by the increasing number of “no cause” determi­
nations made by investigators (up from 28 per­
cent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1992).
In sum, because of the amount of time and 
money it takes to investigate and prosecute or 
adjudicate a case, the current enforcement sys­
tem is, according to one federal court judge, sim­
ply a “bad system for both the employer and the 
employee.”3 In practice, however, we propose that 
the current system hurts only the good actors— 
employees with legitimate claims and employers 
falsely accused of discrimination. Conversely, the 
system benefits the bad actors—employers who 
discriminate and employees who file frivolous 
claims.
We believe that there are ways to avoid the 
system’s shortcomings. Specifically, mandatory- 
arbitration agreements, where enforceable, may 
be the most effective of those alternatives.
Is Mandated Arbitration Legal?
The law regarding whether an arbitration clause 
in an employment agreement can preclude the 
judicial adjudication of statutory rights (e.g., dis­
crimination, wage and salary issues) is complex 
and unsettled. In almost every jurisdiction, how­
ever, a compulsory-arbitration policy will prevent 
nonunion employees from bringing a discrimi-
The current system is essentially a de facto 
severance system— a process of settling 
discrimination claims regardless of merit.
nation lawsuit into federal court. A union arbi­
tration clause will not have the same preclusive 
effect, except in the Fourth Circuit.4 To explain 
the specifics of the law, it is necessary to examine 
the two leading U.S. Supreme Court decisions, 
as well as several U.S Court of Appeals cases.
Text con tinu es on p a g e  63
3The Honorable James Moran, chief judge for the U.S. Dis­
trict Court, Northern District of Illinois, quoted in: Peter 
Eisler, “Waiting for Justice,” USA Today, August 15, 1995, 
p. A l.
4 See: Austin v. O wens Brockway Glass Container, 78 F.3d 875 
(4th Cir. 1996).
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A New Look at Arbitration
In October 1997 C ornell Q uarterly published the ac­
companying article discussing the legal and practical 
concerns surrounding arbitration of discrimination 
lawsuits. Four years later the issue remains relevant and 
has grown in importance. The following is an update of 
the law since the article was published four years ago.
New Arbitration Holdings
In 1997 we identified the applicability of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) as an issue that may determine 
whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable. The 
FAA endorses arbitration, but excludes from coverage 
employment contracts of employees engaged in foreign 
or interstate commerce. At the time, six circuits had 
interpreted the exception as applying only to employees 
in the transportation industry. Consequently, in those 
jurisdictions, employers outside the transportation in­
dustry were free to require employees to sign arbitra­
tion agreements. Four circuits, including the Ninth 
Circuit, had not ruled on the issue and one circuit, 
the Fourth, had held that the FAA was irrelevant.
In 1999 the Ninth Circuit finally weighed in on the 
issue.1 Predictably, this court ruled against employers 
by holding that: (1) the FAA exception covered all em­
ployment contracts; and (2) that mandatory arbitration 
agreements were unenforceable because they did not 
fall under the FAA. In March 2001 the Supreme 
Court, in C ircu it C ity Stores v. Adams, rejected the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding and ruled that the FAA’s ex­
ception was lim ited to the transportation industry.2 
Many observers suggested that the Supreme Court’s 
holding ended the controversy and essentially legalized 
mandatory arbitration. This, however, is not the case. 
Instead, there is another legal barrier to arbitration, and 
that is Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Section 118 states, in part, that: “[wjhere appropri­
ate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alter­
native dispute resolution, including...arbitration, is 
encouraged to resolve disputes arising under [Title VII 
and the ADA].” In D u ffie ld  v. R obertson S tephens & Co. 
the Ninth Circuit held that Section 118 prohibits man­
datory arbitration (because it states that arbitration is 
“encouraged”) .3 The First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, and District of Columbia circuits have 
rejected D uffield .4 T h o s e  courts held that Section 118 
does not prohibit and may, in fact, allow mandatory 
arbitration, albeit the D.C. Circuit Court’s language 
offered that conclusion only by strong implication. The 
remaining circuits have not yet ruled on the issue.
One California district court has held that the Su­
preme Court overturned D u ffie ld  in C ircu it City.7 At 
least two other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have 
rejected such an interpretation and held that D u ffie ld  is
still good law.6 W hat this means is that at this time, 
mandatory arbitration is lawful in the First, Second, 
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. circuits. While 
the law is unsettled in the Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh circuits, it is likely that those circuits will fol­
low the majority by rejecting D u ffie ld  and upholding 
arbitration. W hat will happen to D u ffie ld  in the Ninth 
Circuit is anyone’s guess. Regardless, we expect the Su­
preme Court to clarify this issue by overturning D uffie ld  
in the near future.
In addition to legal challenges, mandatory arbitration 
is still under attack from the EEOC (Equal Employ­
ment Opportunity Commission) and certain members 
of Congress (see the sidebar on page 64). Senator 
Russell Feingold (D-Wisconsin) and Representative 
Edward Markey (D-Massachusetts) have proposed legis­
lation to overturn C ircu it C ity and to prohibit manda­
tory arbitration. This legislation has been proposed since 
the early 1990s and has not succeeded to date. We see 
no reason why that will change in the immediate future.
Since 1997 the law surrounding mandatory arbitra­
tion has been clarified with regard to the FAA, but 
has become muddied by Section 118. Still, the courts 
(except for the Ninth Circuit) have been favorable 
toward arbitration. This is a trend that we believe will 
continue.—J.B . T. a n d  D.S.S.
1 See: Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (1999).
2 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001).
3 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). See also: David Sherwyn, 
J. Bruce Tracey, and Zev Eigen, “In Defense of Mandatory 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Saving the Baby, Toss­
ing Out the Bath Water, and Constucting a New Sink In 
the Process,” J ou rn a l o f  Labor a n d  Employm ent Law, Uni­
versity of Pennsylvania, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 1999).
4 First Circuit: Rosenberg v. M errill Lynch, P ierce, F enner & 
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); Second Circuit: 
D esiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 1999); Third 
Circuit: Seus v. John  N uveen & Co., 146 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 
1998); Fourth Circuit: Hooters of America, Inc. Philips, 
173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999); Fifth Circuit: M outon v. 
M etropolitan Life Ins. Co., 147 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1998); 
Seventh Circuit: Koveleski v. SBC Capital Markets, Inc., 167 
F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 1999); and District of Columbia Cir­
cuit: Borg-W arner P rotective S ervices Corp. v. U nited States 
EEOC, 245 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
3 Olivares v. H ispanic Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5760 
(C.D. Cal. 2001).
6 See: M elton v. Philip  Morris, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
12601 (D. Or. Aug. 9, 2001); and LeLouis v. Western D irec­
tory Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1251 (D. Or. 2001).
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In Alexander v. Gardner—D enver Company, the 
Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause 
in a collective-bargaining agreement does not bar 
a union employee from litigating a Title VII dis­
crimination case in federal court, even if the 
employee had already sought arbitration and lost 
the decision.5 For a time lower courts extended 
this holding to nonunion work environments, 
so that compulsory-arbitration clauses could 
not prevent any employee, union or nonunion, 
from litigating any right protected by anti­
discrimination statutes.
Then, in Gilmer v. Interstate—Johnson  Lane 
Corporation, the Supreme Court distinguished 
its Gardner—D enver decision and held that a 
compulsory-arbitration clause could after all pre­
vent a nonunion employee from filing an age- 
discrimination claim in federal court.6 (See the 
sidebar at right for the court’s reasoning.) Among 
its arguments the court pointed out that, unlike 
the G ardner-D enver case, the arbitration clause 
in Gilmer’s employment contract was enforce­
able under the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
(FAA).7
An Irrelevant Law?
The FAA “reflects a liberal policy of favoring ar­
bitration,” the court wrote.8 This statute requires 
the enforcement of arbitration awards, establishes 
a limited standard of review, and develops pro­
cedures for the selection of arbitrators, among 
other things. Section 2 of the FAA states that the 
act applies to all contracts affecting commerce. 
Section 1 of the FAA, however, excludes from 
coverage “all contracts of em ployment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other classi­
fication of workers engaged in foreign or inter­
state commerce.”
In Gilmer the arbitration clause was enforce­
able under the FAA because the contract was not 
between the employee and the employer, but was 
instead between the employee and the New York 
Stock Exchange. This distinction allowed the
Text continues on pa ge 66
5 A lexander v. G a rdn er-D en ver  Company, 415 U.S. 36 
(1974).
6 G ilm er v. Interstate—Johnson  Lane Corporation, 111 S.Ct. 
1647 (1991).
7 9 U .S.C. Section 1.
8 Gilmer, at 1657.
Union versus Nonunion Work 
Environments
In G ilm er v. Intersta te—John son  Lane C orporation  the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that a compulsory-arbitration 
clause could prevent a nonunion employee from filing 
an age-discrimination claim in federal court.’ The spe­
cific facts of this case are as follows. To gain employ­
ment, Gilmer, the plaintiff (a registered securities repre­
sentative), signed the New York Stock Exchange’s 
securities registration application. The application con­
tained a compulsory-arbitration clause. On being termi­
nated from his position with his employer, the plaintiff 
filed an Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) lawsuit in federal court. The court held that 
the arbitration clause was enforceable and barred the 
plaintiff from filing an age-discrimination suit in federal 
court. Subsequent to that G ilm er decision, lower courts 
extended the holding to alleged violations ofT itle VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Supreme Court’s holding in G ilm er may seem to 
be at odds with that of A lexander v. G ardn er-D enver 
Company, in which the Supreme Court held that an 
arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining agreement 
does not bar a union employee from litigating a Title 
VII discrimination case in federal court.2
The G ilm er court distinguished its holding from that 
in G ardn er-D enver  for three reasons. First, because a 
labor arbitrator’s role is limited to enforcing the parties’ 
collective-bargaining agreement, the arbitrator in 
G ardn er-D enver did not have the authority to deter­
mine whether the discrimination law had been violated. 
Second, the G ilm er court noted that the G ardn er- 
D en ver arbitrator’s task was to “effectuate the best inter­
ests of the parties,” even if those interests were in con­
flict with the employee’s statutory rights. The G ilm er 
court implied that one of the arguments for the 
G ardn er-D enver decision against mandatory arbitration 
was the fear that unions would, as they can do with any 
grievance, sacrifice an individual employee’s discrimina­
tion charge for the benefit of the bargaining unit as a 
whole. Because there was no union to horse trade 
Gilmer’s rights away, the court found mandatory arbi­
tration to be appropriate in the nonunion setting. 
Finally, unlike the one in G ardner-D enver, the arbitra­
tion clause in G ilm er was enforceable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act of 1925.3 However, one circuit (the 
Fourth) sees no such distinction, as explained in the 
accompanying article.4—D.S.S. andJ .B .T .
■i l l  S.Ct. 1647 (1991).
2 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3 U .S.C. Section 1.
4 See: Austin v. Owens—Brockway Glass Container, 78 F.3d 
875 (4th Cir. 1996).
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Adjudication Is Expensive and Inefficient
To file a discrimination lawsuit against an employer, 
employees must first file a charge of discrimination with 
either the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis­
sion (EEOC) or with a state or local agency that is au­
thorized to investigate such claims. The agency with 
which an employee files a charge will investigate the 
allegation and try to settle the matter by having the 
employer remunerate or reinstate the employee. If the 
employer and employee cannot agree on a settlement, 
the agency determines whether there is cause to believe 
that discrimination occurred. If the agency finds no 
cause, the employee can either drop the case or request a 
right-to-sue letter, which enables the employee to file an 
action in federal or state court. If the agency finds cause, 
it may, depending on the agency (1) issue a right-to-sue 
letter, (2) set the case for trial before its own administra­
tive adjudication process, or (3) become the employee’s 
counsel and file an action in federal court on the 
claimant’s behalf.
In establishing administrative procedures for han­
dling employment-discrimination cases, the EEOC and 
the U.S. Congress attempted to develop a system that 
would provide employees with an agency to investigate 
all charges yet would not expose employers to the high 
costs associated with litigation. More than 30 years after 
its enactment, however, it is clear to us that the system 
is not accomplishing its goals. For example, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 made employment-discrimination 
claims more attractive to plaintiffs and their attorneys 
by allowing jury trials and providing for punitive and 
compensatory damages.1
Voluntary ADR. The EEOC has acknowledged the 
system’s inefficiencies by creating a number o f proce­
dures to reduce its backlog of complaints and weed out 
frivolous cases. One such procedure is voluntary alterna­
tive dispute resolution. Unfortunately, the EEOC’s call 
for a voluntary plan will not seriously affect employers 
or employees because, we propose, most parties w ill act 
strategically by using litigation as a bargaining tool.
In our view, the only cases where both parties are 
likely to arbitrate is where they both truly believe that 
they can prove their cases. We believe that this repre­
sents an insignificant number of claims. Moreover, we 
believe that in the bulk of cases either the employer or 
the employee knows she or he has a weak case or de­
fense. We strongly believe, therefore, that both employ­
ees and employers would be better served by mandatory 
arbitration agreements.
For example, consider those employers who know 
that they have violated the law and those that acted in 
good faith and are innocent but cannot prove it for lack 
of good documentation and witnesses (i.e., they believe
that they have “bad facts”) . Such employers likely will 
not voluntarily submit their claims to arbitration. Such 
employers do not want a relatively quick assessment of 
damages against them. Instead, those employers can use 
the delay and discovery tactics that are part and parcel 
of federal-court litigation to force the aggrieved em­
ployee to accepted a lim ited settlement. Likewise, em­
ployees who file frivolous cases will not be encouraged 
to arbitrate. They would be better off subjecting the 
employer to the potential costs of drawn-out litigation 
in hopes of receiving any settlement offer at all, not to 
mention a settlement offer that is larger than they could 
expect in arbitration.
Big settlements. In addition to increasing the num­
ber of claims filed, the current complaint procedures 
have increased the amount of settlements, despite the 
actual merits of the complaints. When damages con­
sisted primarily of back pay, employees’ damages were 
capped as soon as they found new employment that 
paid them as much or more than they had been earning 
in their previous positions. In such situations an em­
ployer could almost always settle the case for back pay 
only.2 Now, however, employees have an incentive to 
reject a settlement offer in the hope of receiving an even 
larger settlement.
Another problem created by the current system of 
adjudication is the emphasis on settling claims regard­
less o f their merit or validity. Such a d e  fa c t o  severance 
system is a natural outgrowth of the practical realities 
associated with the current enforcement system. To file 
a charge of discrimination, employees must establish a 
p r im a  fa c i e  case of discrimination. Establishing such a 
case is simple. Employees need only prove that (1) they 
are members o f a protected class, (2) they were mini­
mally qualified for the position, (3) they were mis­
treated by their employer, and (4) employees who do 
not belong to that protected class were not mistreated.3
Such employees do not have to provide any evidence 
of discrimination, they do not need an attorney, and 
they do not have to pay a filing fee. The EEOC accepts 
and investigates all charges. Moreover, some state agen­
cies not only accept and investigate all charges, but they 
actually help employees “fit” their facts into the p r im a  
f a c i e  criteria.4 Thus, the d e  fa c t o  severance system exists 
because it is simple for an employee to file a charge 
of discrimination and it is costly for an employer to 
defend a charge.
Employers accused of discrimination are required to 
complete a questionnaire and provide the investigating 
agency with a statement of position. Responding to a 
discrimination charge may cost an employer thousands 
of dollars in attorneys’ fees. If the case is not resolved at
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the agency level and is instead adjudicated in court, the 
employer’s attorneys’ fees may be astronomical. Addi­
tional employer costs include the loss of productivity of 
other employees involved in the case, adverse publicity, 
and, of course, liability. Because defending a discrimina­
tion charge can cost an employer hundreds of thou­
sands of dollars, there is a strong incentive for employ­
ers to settle a case regardless of merit.
The current system also provides investigators with a 
strong incentive to settle cases. Some agencies evaluate 
the investigators by how many cases they close each 
quarter. For example, we were told by state officials that 
in 1994 the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission 
required its investigators to close 12 cases per month.
It is standard operating procedure for some state in­
vestigators to attempt to settle a case without even dis­
cussing the case’s merits or reviewing the file. Even em­
ployers who are outraged at the allegation may be 
convinced by their attorney and the investigator that it 
is in their best financial interest to pay the employee a 
nominal amount of money (and sometimes a substan­
tial amount) instead of defending the case. When news 
of such settlements travels among employees, it is pos­
sible that the employer w ill be faced with numerous 
baseless claims from other employees also seeking d e  
fa c t o  severance awards.
Under the current system claims are not investigated 
in a timely or comprehensive manner. One reason for 
the delays is that the EEOC’s caseload has increased 
while the number of investigators has decreased.5
The negative effects of the system on both hospitality 
firms and employees is also evidenced by the number of 
“no cause” determinations made by investigators. In 
1980 the EEOC found no cause in 28.5 percent of the 
49,225 cases it closed. In 1992 the agency found no 
cause in 61 percent of the 68,366 cases it closed. Em­
ployers argue that the increase in the number of no­
cause findings results from an increase in the number 
of frivolous filings, while employee advocates point 
to a General Accounting Office study that found the 
EEOC failed to adequately investigate between 40 and 
80 percent of the no-cause cases.6
This is not surprising since, as we said, the investiga­
tors’ performance is often evaluated by the number of 
cases closed and because agencies are reluctant to find 
cause because such findings necessitate the allocation of 
increasingly scarce resources.7
Bad-actor employers and employees use the costs and 
delays of the system to their benefit. Investigators who 
push cases to close regardless of merit reinforce the bad 
actors’ actions by threatening innocent employers with 
the costs of investigation and litigation, on the one
hand, and employees with delays and the probability of 
no-cause findings, on the other. As a result, many em­
ployers settle these cases no matter what. Similarly, un­
employed former employees with legitimate claims may 
choose a modest settlement today rather than the op­
portunity to be awarded more money sometime in the 
future.—D.S.S. a n d  J.B . T.
1 Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 damages consisted 
of reinstatement, back pay, and attorneys’ fees.
2 While an employee could reject the settlement offer and 
continue the claim to obtain reinstatement, in fact few newly 
employed workers want to return to work for an employer 
that they have sued.
3M cD onnell D ouglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4 The system contains an incentive that encourages this type 
of outcome. The federal government bases its funding of 
state agencies on the number of claims an agency handles. 
Consequently, some state agencies evaluate their intake of­
ficers by tracking the number of claims they receive. Intake 
officers are encouraged, therefore, to help create charges to 
develop a claim, even if they believe the law has not been 
violated.
5 From 1989 through 1994 discrimination claims rose 46.7 
percent and the number of investigators at the EEOC 
dropped by 13 percent. The combination of increased claims 
and fewer investigators results in extensive delays and, ac­
cording to the General Accounting Office, an increase in 
the percentage of no-cause findings (see: Peter Eisler, “Wait­
ing for Justice,” USA Today, August 15, 1995, p. A l) . Some 
cases are not investigated for over two years. At this writing 
[in 1997], state agencies and the EEOC have dose to 
200,000 open cases, an increase of 71.1 percent from 1990. 
Because the EEOC closed only 71,563 cases in 1994 (ac­
cording to EEOC E nforcem ent Statistics, FY 1980-FY 1994), 
it seems certain that the delays will only worsen.
6Eisler, p. A l.
7 An example of an agency that discourages cause findings 
is the Pennsylvania Human Rights Office in Pittsburgh. 
Investigators are encouraged to try to settle cases regardless 
of merit. If a case cannot be settled, however, it is nearly 
impossible for an investigator to “find cause.” Findings of 
cause must be approved by the legal department. Accord­
ing to the investigators, their recommendations to find cause 
are rejected unless the employee’s case is considered impos­
sible to close otherwise.
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2001 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly 65
LAW QUARTERLY CLASSIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION
court to rule that the stock exchange’s arbitra­
tion clause was enforceable under the FAA. Two 
questions were not answered by the court regard­
ing the lawfulness of the mandatory-arbitration 
agreements, however. Those are: (1) Does the 
FAA exclude all employment contracts from its 
jurisdiction?, and (2) Does exclusion from the
It is risky for employers to implement a mandatory- 
arbitration policy in those circuits where the courts 
have yet to rule on which employees can be covered.
FAA’s coverage prevent a compulsory-arbitration 
clause from being enforceable? The court’s fail­
ure to answer those questions is why it is unclear 
whether compulsory-arbitration policies are en­
forceable in all jurisdictions.9
Excluding contracts. The first question cen­
ters on the interpretation of the exclusionary 
phase in the FAA’s Section 1 that reads: “any other 
classification of worker engaged in interstate or 
foreign commerce.” Some lower courts interpret 
this clause broadly and hold that it excludes from 
the FAA’s coverage contracts between any em­
ployer and any employee. However, the major­
ity of U.S Courts of Appeals holds that the ex­
clusionary clause refers only to employees in the 
transportation industry. Under the latter inter­
pretation, the FAA applies to all other employ­
ees such that an arbitration clause prevents all 
but a small class of employees from litigating their 
claims in federal court. The First, Second, Third, 
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh circuits all narrowly 
interpret that exemption and hold that the FAA 
does, in fact, apply to the majority of employ­
ment contracts (excluding only those workers in 
the transportation industry).10
9 The court’s distinction that Gilmer’s arbitration agreement 
was not with his employer seems odd when one examines 
the actual agreement. The agreement addresses disputes 
between the employee and employer. Thus, the fact that 
the contract was with the stock exchange and not the em­
ployer does not, it seems to us, affect the context of the 
agreement.
10 See: Dickstein v. D upont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971); 
E rving v. The Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 
(2 Cir. 1972); Tenney E ngineerin g v. U nited E lectrica l R. & 
M. Workers, 207 F.2d450 (3rd Cir. 1953); Rojas v. TKC om ­
m unications, In c.,87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996); Aspuldh Tree 
Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1995); and M iller 
B rew in g Company v. B rew ery Workers L ocal Union No. 9, 
739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir. 1984).
The Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
circuits have not ruled on the meaning of the 
FAA’s Section 1 exclusion. As such it would be 
risky for an employer governed by those circuits 
to implement an arbitration policy.11
The only court of appeals holding that fol­
lows the broad interpretation of the FAA’s Sec­
tion 1 is the Fourth Circuits 1954 decision in 
U nited  E lectric R adio & M ach in e Workers o f  
America v. M iller M eta l Products}1 The M iller 
holding may no longer be relevant, however, be­
cause of two more-recent cases. In K ropfelder v. 
Snap-On Tools Corporation the Fourth Circuit 
distinguished M iller by holding that it applied 
to collective-bargaining agreements only.13 The 
Kropfelder court then upheld a nonunion arbi­
tration agreement.
Enforcing arbitration. The Fourth Circuit 
may also have answered the second question left 
open by the Gilmer decision, which is whether 
the FAA is relevant to the arbitration of discrimi­
nation claims. In Austin v. Owens—Brockway Glass 
Container the court limited the M iller decision 
and held that the FAA did not apply to labor 
disputes (in its circuit). Despite this holding, 
however, the court still upheld the enforceability 
of the arbitration clause by relying on a national 
labor-law policy encouraging arbitration, regard­
less of the FAA’s applicability:
In deciding whether to enforce the arbi­
tration provision in the collective bargain­
ing agreement, we start with and rely on 
the well-recognized policy of federal la­
bor law favoring the arbitration of labor 
disputes.14
The. Austin decision has been criticized because 
it ignores the fact that Gilmer did not overturn 
the Gardner—D enver decision and instead distin­
guished the case because of the union-nonunion 
distinction. Austin, however, does articulate the
11 While there are district-court cases in those circuits that 
follow the interpretation of the majority of circuit courts, 
district courts are not bound by the precedent set in other 
circuits and, moreover, their decisions may be overturned 
by their circuit courts.
12 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
13 Krop feld er v. Snap-On Tools Corporation, 859 F.Supp. 952 
(D.Md. 1994).
14 Austin at 879.
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obvious point. The enforceability of a policy 
mandating the arbitration of a discrimination 
complaint should not be based on the applica­
bility of a statute passed 40 years before Title VII. 
Instead, courts should follow the well-established 
practice of encouraging arbitration to settle dis­
putes between employees and employers. Based 
on Austin, as well as a number of other cases, we 
believe that absent legislation to the contrary, 
arbitration will likely be formally extended to all 
employment contracts in the future, without re­
gard to the FAA.15
M inimum Requirements of 
Arbitration Policies
Courts will enforce an arbitration policy only if 
it provides a fair process for adjudicating employ­
ees’ statutory rights. In judging fairness, courts 
examine the policy’s content, not its author. Thus, 
an employer cannot assure itself of surviving ju­
dicial scrutiny simply by allowing a neutral third 
party or even employees to help draft the arbi­
tration agreement. Unfortunately, neither the 
U.S. Supreme Court nor Congress has expressly 
defined the criteria that, if  met, would consti­
tute a fair policy. This does not mean, however, 
that there is a dearth of authority as to what con­
stitutes a fair policy. In arguing that particular 
arbitration systems are not fair, employees have 
focused on a number of different procedures that 
are inherent to every policy. The courts’ hold­
ings in response to such employee attacks pro­
vide a basis for establishing the criteria of what 
an enforceable policy must contain. It should be 
noted, however, that because the courts are re­
acting to complaints, as opposed to establishing 
criteria, the holdings are not always definitive and 
may not provide absolute guidance. Still, there is 
enough information to provide employers with 
the guidance necessary to draft a policy that will 
almost certainly be upheld.
In examining fairness, Gilmer and its progeny 
focus on the following five issues: (1) the method 
of delivering opinions, (2) the procedures for se­
lecting fair and impartial arbitrators, (3) discov­
ery, (4) the damages available, and (5) whether 
the agreement was entered into voluntarily and 
knowingly.
Opinion procedures. The first issue, how the 
arbitrator’s opinion should be delivered, is the 
simplest to address. In Gilmer the court noted 
that the stock exchange’s procedures required 
written opinions. While the court did not hold 
that having written opinions is a requirement, it 
did imply that a policy should provide for them. 
Employers have a strong incentive to comply with 
this standard because, in addition to satisfying 
judicial review, written opinions will enable ar­
bitration participants to study the outcomes of 
prior complaints. Such a study is vital when 
choosing an arbitrator and deciding whether to 
settle a case.
Selecting arbitrators. The selection of a fair 
and impartial arbitrator is a two-step process with 
requirements that are easily addressed. First, 
courts will not enforce a policy that does not 
allow for a fair and impartial third party to adju­
dicate the case. For example, in C anindin v. 
Renaissance H otel Associates, the employers arbi­
tration policy allowed managers to select a com­
mittee to hear employer—employee disputes.16 
The committee comprised two employees, two 
managers, and the general manager, who would 
act as a tie breaker. Because the adjudicators were 
selected by management (and the tie breaker was 
a manager), the court held that the policy was 
unfair and therefore did not require the employee
Courts w ill enforce a rb itra tion  policies 
only if they provide a fair process for adjud­
icating employees' statutory rights.
to submit her claim to the arbitrators. Instead, 
the holding enabled the employee to file her claim 
in court.
Second, courts agree that the employee must 
be able to participate in the selection of the fair 
and impartial arbitrator. In Gilmer, the NYSE’s 
procedures allowed the pool of arbitrators to be 
appointed by the stock exchange’s director of ar­
bitration, and both the exchange and the com­
plainant had a say in the choice of arbitrator.
15 For example, see: Central States Pension F und v. Tank Trans­
porta tion , 779 F.Supp. 947 (N.D.I11. 1991). 1 50 Cal. App. 4th 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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Employees Can Always File 
Charges with the EEOC
It should be noted that the court in G ilm er v. In ter- 
s ta te-Joh n son  Lane C orporation  held that an arbitration 
clause cannot prevent an employee from filing a charge 
with the EEOC.1 That is, under G ilm er an arbitration 
clause can prevent employees from filing suit, but can­
not prevent the EEOC from litigating their cases.2 
Several conditions may prompt involvement by the 
EEOC. First, an arbitration decision need not have 
any legal standing with or effect on the EEOC. Thus, 
the EEOC may completely ignore an arbitrators find­
ing and issue a right-to-sue letter. Second, regardless 
of whether the EEOC gives any consideration to an 
arbitration decision, it may initiate a full investigation 
of a discrimination claim. Third, the agency may lit i­
gate on behalf of an employee or group of employees 
(i.e., a class action) if  the agency believes that there is a 
relevant issue of law that should be decided by a court. 
However, since the EEOC litigates only one-half of 
one percent of the charges filed, arbitration agreements 
w ill almost always allow the employer and employee to 
avoid federal court.
The fact that employees can file cases with the 
EEOC is at the heart o f a dispute filed with the Na­
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Bentley’s Lug­
gage Corporation, a Florida employer, required all its 
employees to sign an agreement under which they 
agreed to arbitrate any employment dispute. In addi­
tion to its general waiver language, the policy specifi­
cally stated that employees could not file charges with 
any federal or state agency. Along with violating the 
G ilm er holding (which expressly stated that claims 
may be filed with the EEOC), it seems obvious that 
federal and state agencies, such as the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, the Department of 
Labor, and the NLRB, would not look kindly on an 
agreement that effectively made them moot.
Not surprisingly, then, the NLRB issued a com­
plaint to determine whether such an agreement vio­
lates the National Labor Relations Act. Bentley’s em­
ployees settled with their employer, and the employer 
altered the agreement so that it now complies with 
G ilm er (that is, it allows employees to file charges with 
the NLRB regardless of the arbitration require­
ment).—D.S. S. a n d  J.B . T.
’ I l l  S. Ct. 1647(1991).
2 The rationale is that the EEOC is authorized to investi­
gate any claims of employment discrimination regardless 
of whether an employee has waived such rights. Because 
most state agencies do not initiate lawsuits on behalf of 
complainants for discrimination cases, however, an arbitra­
tion clause should, according to this analysis, prevent dis­
crimination claims.
Employee advocates criticized this policy because 
an employer representative established the pool 
of arbitrators, the pool almost always consisted 
of white men who were over 55 years of age, and 
the arbitrators were not trained in discrimina­
tion law. Despite those objections, the court ac­
cepted the system because, in choosing the arbi­
trator from the pool, each side was allowed one 
peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges 
for cause.
To avoid challenges and employee resistance 
based on selection of arbitrators, we suggest us­
ing the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 
This association has established pools of arbitra­
tors who are impartial, trained in the subject, and 
represent a diverse population. The use of AAA 
for selection of the arbitrator would have satis­
fied the court in Canindin, for instance, and was 
expressly endorsed by a Texas district court.17
Level o f discovery. Establishing the level of 
discovery is not as simple as setting forth how 
opinions shall be given and how arbitrators will 
be chosen. In Williams v. Katten, M uchin &Zavis 
the Seventh Circuit upheld the AAA’s discovery 
rules.18 Under those rules, the arbitrator may 
subpoena witnesses and documents either inde­
pendently or on the request of parties. This level 
of discovery, which is minimal when compared 
to that of federal court, was acceptable to the 
Seventh Circuit. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
neither upheld nor rejected the AAA’s discovery 
procedures. In Gilmer the court stated that par­
ties choosing arbitration trade the procedures 
of federal court for the simplicity, informality, 
and experience of arbitration. Denying enforce­
ment of a policy based on its lack of full-blown 
discovery would contradict the court’s logic in 
this instance. Thus, we believe that parties have 
a choice of either following the AAA’s discovery 
rules or (to be really safe) expanding discovery 
to the levels approaching those suggested in 
Gilmer (i.e., document production, information 
requests, depositions, and subpoenas). In making 
this decision it should be noted that in most cases 
discovery helps the plaintiff more than it does 
the employer. Presumably the employer knows
17 See: Olson v. A merican A rbitration Association, Inc., 876 
F.Supp. 850 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
18 Williams v. Katten M uch in & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430; 
(N.D. IL1993).
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why it made a personnel-related decision and can 
find all of the relevant facts.
Assessing damages. Damages is another issue 
that presents the employer with both choices and 
risks. In G ilmer the arbitrator had authority to 
award the full damages available under the stat­
ute.19 The court further stated:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, 
a party does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by the statute; it only sub­
mits to their resolution in arbitral rather 
than a judicial forum.
This language implies that an arbitration 
policy cannot limit damages, and most lower 
courts agree. In fact, the majority of courts has 
held that an arbitrator can award punitive dam­
ages that are provided for by statutory law, even 
if the arbitration agreement prohibits such. For 
example, in Graham O il Company v. Arco P rod­
ucts Company the Ninth Circuit refused to en­
force an arbitration agreement because it elimi­
nated provisions for punitive dam ages.20 
However, some courts disagree with this analy­
sis. In Barvarati v. Josphthal Lyon & Ross, Inc., 
Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Cir­
cuit stated that parties to an arbitration agree­
ment could stipulate that punitive damages not 
be awarded.21 Similarly, in K innebrew  v. G u lf In­
surance Company the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas upheld an arbitration 
policy that eliminated punitive damages, attor­
neys’ fees, and reinstatement.22 In this case, how­
ever, the court retained jurisdiction to examine 
statutory remedies to which the employee could 
be entitled.
Employers who wish to limit relief can attempt 
to do so. In some jurisdictions, like the Seventh 
Circuit, employers may be able to do so success­
fully. There are, however, two risks involved. First, 
the courts may not enforce the policy. Second, it 
is likely that employees will perceive a policy that 
limits damages as being unfair. As we explain in
19
sist
a moment, the perception of being fair is, we 
believe, an essential component of the fifth issue 
that employers must address—that is, imple­
menting a determination.
Voluntary agreements. Given that the current 
system for adjudicating claims is a bad one for 
both employers and employees, arbitration may 
be a beneficial alternative for both sides. To ben­
efit everyone, though, we believe that an arbitra­
tion policy must be drafted and implemented in 
such a manner that employees will welcome the 
idea. Limiting damages, for example, will not be 
viewed favorably by employees. Instead, employ­
ees may view the policy as the employer’s attempt 
to attack employees’ rights. Such a view will sabo­
tage the last requirement of a lawful arbitration 
policy, which is that the process must constitute 
the employees’ willing and knowing waiver of 
their right to file a federal-court action.
In G ilmer the court stated that “mere inequal­
ity in bargaining power.. .is not a sufficient rea­
son to hold that arbitration agreements are never 
enforceable in the employment context.”23 The 
court then held that the waiver was voluntary 
because the employee was a sophisticated busi­
ness person. Because this may not always be the
One court refused to enforce an arbitration 
agreement because it eliminated provisions 
for punitive damages.
5 In age-discrimination cases under ADEA, damages con- 
 of back pay, reinstatement, attorneys’ fees, and liqui­
dated damages. Liquidated damages are equal to the amount 
of back pay.
20 43 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
21 28 F.2d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
22 67 FEP Cases 189, 190 (N. Tex. 1994).
case, and to avoid litigation, we believe that em­
ployers should implement procedures to ensure 
employees’ full knowledge and understanding of 
the policy as a way to encourage employees’ ac­
ceptance of the agreement.
Fairness and scope. Finally, to be enforceable 
an arbitration agreement must comply with cer­
tain standards regarding scope and fairness. The 
former conclusion is underscored by two cases, 
namely, Prudentia l Insurance Company o f  Ameri­
can v. Lai and Farrand v. Lutheran B rotherhood,24
23 Gilm er at 1655.
24 See: P rud en tia l In surance C ompany o f  A merican v. Lai, 42 
F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); and Farrand v. Lutheran B roth­
erhood, 993 F.2d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993).
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In those two cases, the Ninth and Seventh 
circuits held that generic arbitration clauses that 
did not explicitly state that they covered all em­
ployment disputes were not specific enough to 
provide employees with notice that they were 
bound to arbitrate Title VII claims and age- 
discrimination claims (under the Age Discrimi-
Employees should be asked to help craft 
an arbitration agreement.
nation in Employment Act). Complying with the 
notice requirements set forth in Lai and Farrand 
is relatively simple. The policy must explicitly 
state that all employee disputes, including alle­
gations of discrimination, breach of contract, and 
other statutory or common-law claims, will be 
submitted to arbitration.
Complying with the fairness standard is not 
simple, however. The Gilmer court analyzed the 
New York Stock Exchange’s agreement and found 
it fair for a number of reasons. The court did 
not, however, expressly state what a policy must 
include to survive judicial review. Moreover, we 
believe that surviving judicial review is not the 
only standard that employers should strive to 
meet. Instead, an arbitration policy should be 
regarded as something that will benefit both the 
employer and the employees.
Implementing an Arbitration Policy
Employers should first communicate to employ­
ees the employer’s intention to adopt an arbitra­
tion agreement. Employees must clearly under­
stand the implications of such a policy and should 
have an opportunity to discuss the effects of the 
policy’s provisions on their employment. For ex­
ample, employees should be informed that a 
mandatory-arbitration policy does not preclude 
EEOC involvement in a complaint (and they can 
also be forewarned about the difficulties associ­
ated with the EEOC’s investigation and enforce­
ment procedures). Failure to give employees an 
adequate opportunity to discuss and ask ques­
tions about the reasons for the arbitration policy 
can have a profoundly negative impact on the 
employee—employer relationship.
Legislative Developments
Despite the acceptance of arbitration by federal courts 
legislation was pending in both the U.S. House of Rep­
resentatives and the Senate to ban so-called G ilm er 
agreements. The identical bills were sponsored by 
Senator Russell Feingold and Representatives Patricia 
Schroeder and Edward Markey. The Senate bill, which 
was entitled the Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act 
of 1996, would prohibit arbitration unless it was 
agreed to by both parties at the time the case was ripe. 
Feingold and Schroeder drafted similar legislation in 
1993, 1994, and 1995. [As of our original writing, 
however], those bills have never come close to being 
enacted, perhaps because they seem ill conceived. Ac­
cording to the Markey staff member who spoke with us 
and is assigned to answer questions regarding this bill, 
the congressmans objection to arbitration is based in 
large part on the findings of studies regarding the age, 
gender, and ethnicity of securities-industry arbitrators. 
According to that staff member, such arbitrators are 
almost exclusively white men who are at least 60 years 
old. We argue that it is unwise to propose legislation 
banning an entire system because of one aspect that 
could easily be corrected.—D.S.S. a n d  J.B . T.
Second, employees should be asked to help 
craft the arbitration agreement. Arbitration agree­
ments represent more than a legally binding 
employment policy. They involve a “psychologi­
cal contract” that forms a basis of trust and un­
written expectations between employees and 
employers.25 Such expectations may be associ­
ated with employees’ job-related concerns such 
as workload, as well as intangible matters such as 
whether the employees feel “taken care of” by 
the employer. The form and perceived fairness 
of psychological contracts have an effect on em­
ployees’ perceptions and actions. For example, 
some argue that violations of a psychological con­
tract may create so much frustration that an in­
dividual will leave the organization.26 As such, 
involvement from those who will be affected by 
the agreement is critical. Getting line and mana­
gerial employees involved in the development 
process is a sure way to build support for the 
agreement.
25 D. Rousseau, P sycho log ica l Contracts in O rganizations 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995).
26 E.H. Schein , O rga n iz a tio n a l P s y ch o lo g y , 3rd. ed. 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
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Finally, once the agreement is completed, 
its provisions should be introduced through 
company-wide training programs. This is particu­
larly true for new employees, who undoubtedly 
have preconceived ideas about the organization 
and their job. It is critical that orientation pro­
grams incorporate all pertinent information from 
the arbitration agreement, especially as the so­
cialization and orientation process itself has been 
shown to have a profound effect on job perfor­
mance and work attitudes.27
Call for Further Inquiry
Some initial research has shown that replacing 
litigation with arbitration will make the adjudi­
cation process less expensive and less time con­
suming.28 However, a number of issues have yet 
to be examined. For example, there are few data 
on whether arbitrators are more or less apt than 
that the courts are to find for plaintiffs and award 
large damages. It is also unknown whether the 
implementation of an arbitration policy will in­
crease or decrease the number of claims that are 
filed. If the process is perceived as fair, it is pos­
sible that the number of complaints will decrease, 
since employees’ perceptions of their employers’ 
fairness may discourage the employees from 
filing grievances. Another issue for consideration 
is the effect of m andatory arb itration on 
management-employee relations. If employees 
believe that an arbitration agreement provides an 
efficient mechanism for resolving conflict, and if 
they believe that the policy is fair and just, it is 
likely that they will feel a commitment to their 
organization and will therefore be less likely to 
leave it. Rigorous field studies that examine the 
influence of such agreements on these and other 
variables are required to determine the utility of 
arbitration agreements. ■
27 J.P. Wanous, “Tell It Like It Is at Realistic Job Review,” 
Personnel, July-August 1975, p. 54.
28 W.M. Howard, “Arbitrating Claims of Employment 
D iscrim ination,” D ispu te R esolu tion  Jou rn a l, October— 
December 1995, pp. 40-50.
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